# Partisan Fairness\* in Dave's Redistricting App

March 28, 2024 | Redistricting Data Hub (RDH)

\* and other partisan outcomes

# Agenda

- 1. Defining our terms
- 2. What is required?
- 3. How to measure it?
- 4. How to analyze it in DRA?
- 5. Questions



• **Partisan Gerrymandering** is the act of drawing districts with the intent to gain a partisan advantage

• Can lead to:

a. One party winning more districts that they *should* (a lack of **partisan fairness**)

- One party winning more districts that they *should* could mean:
  - a. **Disproportionality**: one party receives disproportionately more seats than would be expected based on the statewide vote

- One party winning more districts that they *should* could mean:
  - a. **Disproportionality**: one party receives disproportionately more seats than would be expected based on the statewide vote
  - b. **Bias**: one party receives more representation than the other, if roles were reversed; a lack of "partisan symmetry"

• Partisan Gerrymandering is the act of drawing districts with the intent to gain a partisan advantage

• Can lead to:

- a. One party winning more districts that they *should* (a lack of partisan fairness)
- b. Fewer **competitive** districts

At the federal level, the US Supreme Court has ruled political gerrymandering to be "incompatible with democratic principles," but also a political question not justiciable in federal court (*Rucho v. Common Cause* 2019)

 Absent Congress passing a law, it is up to the states, by way of ballot initiative, legislation, and/or court interpretation, to determine whether partisan fairness is required in redistricting

- Some states have requirements around partisan fairness, through:
  - a. Legislative prohibitions on "unduly" favoring (or disfavoring) parties (ex: CA, FL, MI)
  - b. Legislative requirements to uphold "partisan fairness" (ex: MO, OH)
  - c. State court interpretations of state constitutions (ex: AK, PA, NC)

 In all cases, requirements often differ for congressional and state legislative maps

• It's important to understand what the rules are - if any - <u>in your state</u>!

# How to Measure? (an example)

Districts [in Missouri] shall be drawn in a manner that achieves partisan fairness ... To this end, the average electoral performance of the two political parties receiving the most votes in the three preceding general elections for governor, for United States Senate, and for President of the United States shall be calculated.

This index shall be defined as the total votes received by each party in the three preceding general elections for governor, for United States Senate, and for President of the United States, divided by the total votes cast for both parties in these elections.

Using this index, the total number of wasted votes for each party, summing across all of the districts in the plan shall be calculated. "Wasted votes" are votes cast for a losing candidate or for a winning candidate in excess of the threshold needed for victory. In any redistricting plan and map of the proposed districts, the difference between the two parties' total wasted votes, divided by the total votes cast for the two parties, shall not exceed fifteen percent.

#### How to Measure? (an example)

No [Florida] apportionment plan or district shall be drawn with the intent to favor or disfavor a political party or an incumbent...

#### How to Measure?

A simple way to conceptualize whether a map exhibits partisan fairness is to look at the number of seats expected to be won by one party, relative to their share of the statewide vote

♦ For example, if a party receives 55% of the votes statewide, they should receive 55% of the seats



This is the essence of (dis)proportionality

#### How to Measure? (an example)

• In Massachusetts in 2020, Biden won 65% of the vote, Trump won 35%

♦ If we assume presidential votes perfectly predict congressional votes, we might expect 3 (~35%) of Massachusetts' 9 congressional seats to be held by Republicans ... but none currently are

 If Republicans comprised 35% of each district, Democrats would likely win all 9 seats

#### How to Measure?

 "Such claims invariably sound in a desire for proportional representation, but the Constitution does not require proportional representation, and federal courts are neither equipped nor authorized to apportion political power as a matter of fairness." (*Rucho v Common Cause* 2019)

#### How to Measure?

 Most states' requirements around partisan fairness are broadly worded, if they exist at all

• There are many measures of partisan fairness

• There is not yet consensus on how best to measure partisan fairness, and we do not endorse any particular metric over another

• Measure of Proportionality

• Much, much more in Advanced

#### Go to www.davesredistricting.org











- The measure of **<u>Proportionality</u>** provides:
  - a. The **percentage deviation** in number of seats expected in this map compared to what is expected under proportional representation
  - b. A **rating** that normalizes the percentage deviation using a "winner's bonus"
  - c. Notes, including the:
    - statewide Democratic vote share, based on an election composite of the two-party vote
    - seat split, or the whole number of seats closest to proportional

- The percentage deviation in number of seats expected in this map compared to what is expected under proportional representation
  - a. Imagine a state with 100 state House seats, with 55% of the electorate voting Republican and 45% voting Democratic
  - b. Proportional representation would predict ~55 seats for Republicans
  - c. If your current map predicts 50 seats for Republicans, then:

55-50/100 = -5% deviation

 Positive values indicate more seats for Republicans, negative values indicate more seats for Democrats

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Proportionality								6	
All else equal, prefer maps that are more proportional.									
Metric Description									
• Disproportionality -19.47% The deviation from the number of whole seats closest to proportional. Smaller is better. By convention, positive values of bias metrics	favor Reput	olicans & I	negativ	e valu	es favo	or Demo	ocrats.		
Rating									
Notes  • The average map-wide Democratic two-party vote share is 58.17%, the Republican 41.83%.  • The number of Democratic seats closest to proportional is 10. The likely number of Democratic seats is 13.31. The likely number of unexpected Democratic seats (won) lost i	s -3.31.						R	ek to to	
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All else equal, prefer maps that are more competitive.									
Metric Description									
Competitiveness 14.20% The percentage of competitive districts. Bigger is better.									
Rating									
Instruction         Instruction           0         20         40         60         80         100           Very Bad         Bad         OK         Good         Very Good									

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- A rating that normalizes the percentage deviation using a "winner's bonus"
  - a. DRA caps the range of proportionality from 0% (no disproportionality) to 20% (historically observed maximum)
  - b. Values are rescaled to range from 0 to 100 and inverted so that higher values indicate more proportional
  - c. The winner's bonus refers to the observation that often, the greater the statewide vote share, the more disproportionate the seats won will be



- You are also provided with some Notes, including:
  - a. statewide Democratic vote share, based on an election composite
  - b. "seat split" whole number of seats closest to proportional for Democrats
  - c. likely number of Democratic seats sum of the predicted probabilities for each party winning each district, and thus often fractional
  - d. "unexpected Democratic seats (won) lost" the difference between proportional (b.) and likely seats (c.)



- Many more measures of partisan fairness in Advanced, including metrics that were cited in:
  - a. Pennsylvania (efficiency gap; mean-median)
  - b. North Carolina (efficiency gap; mean-median; close votes, close seats analysis; partisan symmetry)
  - c. Maryland (efficiency gap)





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Bias Measures			0
These are some promine	ent measur	es of partisan bias.	
Metric		Description	
Proportional	-20.12%	The simple deviation from proportionality using fractional seat shares	
<ul> <li>Efficiency gap</li> </ul>	-11.95%	The relative two-party difference in wasted votes	
• Gamma	-14.33%	The fair difference in seats at the map-wide vote share	
Seats bias	-3.04%	Half the difference in seats at 50% vote share	
Votes bias	-0.93%	The excess votes required for half the seats	
Partisan bias	-2.93%	The difference in seats between the map-wide vote share and the symmetrical counterfactual share	
<ul> <li>Global symmetry</li> </ul>	-2.93%	The overall symmetry of the seats-votes curve	
Partisan bias rating	71	The combined rating of seats bias & votes bias	
Declination	-27.32°	A geometric measure of packing & cracking	
<ul> <li>Mean-median</li> </ul>	2.33%	The average vote share across all districts minus the median vote share	
<ul> <li>Turnout bias</li> </ul>	-0.88%	The difference between the map-wide vote share and the average district share	
Lopsided outcomes	2.79%	The relative two-party difference in excess vote shares	
Proportional seats	9.89	The fractional Democratic seats for the map-wide vote share	
Geographic seats	12.03	The fractional Democratic seats implied by jurisdiction political geography	
<ul> <li>Geographic bias</li> </ul>	-12.58%	The bias due to jurisdiction political geography	
Map seats	13.31	The fractional Democratic seats for the map	
Boundary bias	-7.54%	The bias due to district lines	
Neter			
Notes	a valuaa -f	higa matrica favor Dapublicana & nagativa valuas favor Damaarata	
By convention, positiv	e values of	Dias metrics ravor Republicans & negative values ravor Democrats.	
• Use <u>PlanScore</u> to furth	her assess t	the degree to which a map is gerrymandered. PLANSCORE	

- Other partisan fairness concepts, metrics, and approaches have been cited in litigation in:
  - a. Florida (partisan intent)
  - b. Pennsylvania and Maryland (ensemble analysis)
  - c. Wisconsin (majoritarianism)



Learn more about <u>what states have weighed in on the question of partisan</u> <u>fairness</u> from the Brennan Center

• **Competitiveness** is a redistricting criterion that encourages drawing districts that can be won by either party

Related to the notion of **responsiveness**: how much a *change* in the seat share results from a change in the vote share

- A few states have requirements to:
  - a. uphold competitiveness (AZ, CO, MO, WA)
  - b. prohibit "discouraging" competition (NY)

- The measure of **<u>competitiveness</u>**:
  - a. generates a prediction for each district based on your Primary Election Dataset, where 50% vote share for each party is perfectly competitive, and anything beyond 40 or 60% of the vote share is not at all competitive
  - b. sums these predictions up and divides by the total number of seats
  - c. Normalizes this to range to a value ranging from 0 to 100, with larger values indicating greater competitiveness



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Competitiveness	0
All else equal, prefer maps that are more competitive.	
Metric Description	
Competitiveness 14.20% The percentage of competitive districts. Bigger is better.	
Rating	
Very Bad Bad OK Good Very Good	
Notes <ul> <li>Unlike the partisan lean note in district Statistics that simply counts the number of districts in the 45–55% range, this competitiveness metric uses a probability district competitive set of districts has a ~75% competitiveness.</li> </ul>	ibution with the tails approaching zero at 40% and 60%. Hence, an ideally
	Back to top
Minority Representation	0
All else equal, prefer maps that give minorities more opportunities to elect representatives.	
Potential Opportunity Districts (based on map)	
District VAP % Minority Hispanic Black Asian Native Pacific	
35% ≤ VAP < 40% 3 0 0 0 0 0 0	
40% ≤ VAP < 45% 1 1 1 0 0 0	
45% ≤ VAP < 50% 0 0 1 0 0 0	
50% ≤ VAP < 55% 0 0 1 0 0 0	

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Responsiveness Measures			6
These are some prominent measu	res of responsiveness.		
Metric	Description		
Responsiveness     1.7	1 The slope of the seats-votes curve at the map-wide vote share		
Responsive districts     2.4	1 The likely number of responsive districts		
Overall responsiveness 3.4	5 The overall responsiveness (or winner's bonus)		
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Demographic Voting			0
This is a preliminary analysis of th	e partisan voting patterns of demographic groups.		
For district 🖉 compare	voting to voting ANALYZE		

#### **Take Homes**

There is no consensus regarding how best to identify partisan fairness (or competitiveness/responsiveness)

There are many metrics available, each with their own (dis)advantages



#### **Take Homes**

- You can learn more about these metrics from Alec Ramsay's Medium articles:
  - a. <u>Proportionality</u>
  - b. <u>Two Definitions of Fair</u>
  - c. <u>Seats-Votes Curve</u>
  - d. <u>Competitiveness</u> and <u>Evaluating Competitiveness</u>
  - e. Advanced Measures of Bias and Responsiveness

#### **Questions?**



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